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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to clarify the problems of microfinance and the sustainability of 
microfinance institutions (MFI) in financial crisis. We find, that MFIs are often considered as 
one of the most effective and flexible strategies in the fight against global poverty. Due to 
several often unsolvable problems obstructing easier and faster development of these 
institutions such as: ethnical problems, managerial resources, legal recourses, unfortunate 
recourses and other, the operations of MFIs are often not sufficiently efficient. The 
microfinance sector is in general known for its adaptability and quite healthy survival of past 
financial crises. However, current global financial crisis is testing the resilience of MFIs 
hardly. The MFIs are much more connected to international financial markets now that it was 
the case during previous crises. Therefore we expect that they will not survive the crisis 
without bearing some loses. But the expected losses are relatively smaller when compared to 
other financial institutions. 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, microfinance has received increasing attention in many discussions about 
the never ending problems of poverty and economic growth promotion. The role of 
microfinance institutions (MFI) assumed increased importance after the financial crisis in the 
USA. Microfinance has demonstrated that poor people are viable customers as long as their 
financing is approached in a right was such that moral hazard, adverse selection and other 
agency problems are mitigated. Microfinance development led to a number of strong 
institutions focusing on poor people’s finance and it begun to attract the interest of private 
investors. But despite these achievements, there is still a long way to go to extend access to all 
who need financial services.  
This paper focuses on clarification of sustainability of microfinance institutions during 
financial crisis.  Following this point of view, we first describe the position of   MFI, products 
and services in modern microfinance and their position in developing countries. After this 
exposition we concentrate on role and performance of MFIs worldwide in the light of 
financial and economic crisis in recent years.  
 
Microfinance institutions as providers of financial services  
 
Microfinance institutions originated in developing economies. For the understanding of 
their functions and operations, their position in the finance services sector in the developing 
countries has to be explained first. 
The most obvious group of finance providers both in developed and developing countries 
is represented by well-known traditional banks. These institutions never (or hardly ever) 
provide financial services to the poor clients. And there are many logical reasons why they do 
not do that. The problem of adverse selection and information asymmetry (ex ante as well as 
ex post moral hazard) is really severe in the case of these customers. The poor have no or very 
little income, they do not have steady employment and cannot offer any collateral, which 
banks require. The poor clients have no credit history, banks are too far away to verify and 
observe their behavior – there is little information. In addition, the loans are generally far too 
small compared to transaction costs (bad information, no addresses, no infrastructure...). 
Despite these facts, the potential of credit markets in developing countries is high. Potential 
entrepreneurs are usually missing starting seed capital, but returns on certain small businesses 
are fairly high. The returns on businesses in agriculture and trade can be above 100 % 
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annually (Mexico, Ghana, Kenya). According to empirical evidence, annual returns on 
investments in microenterprises often exceed 100 percent too. 
The other source of finance is represented by microfinance institutions which could be 
classified into three main categories, depending on the regulatory thresholds of their 
organizational structures:    
Informal institutions (self-help groups, credit associations, families, individual money 
lenders) properly do not have the status of institutions. They are providers of microfinance 
services on a voluntary basis and are not subject to any kind of control or regulation.  
 Semi-formal institutions are usually registered entities, subject to all relevant general laws. 
They can be defined as microfinance financial intermediaries (MFFIs) and they represent the 
most traditional category of MFI: they are mostly credit-only institutions which provide 
various financial services but generally, they do not collect deposits or alternatively they 
cannot grant credit, as is the case with postal saving banks. Therefore, MFFIs are subject to 
financial regulatory requirements, according to the wideness of their financial intermediation 
activities, but they are not under banking regulation. Within this category, it is possible to 
include different types of institutions with different structural and organizational complexity 
(financial NGOs, financial cooperatives, credit unions, postal saving banks). The most 
popular and widespread are, however, financial NGOs that operate principally by offering 
microcredit as part of development projects, often combined with the offer of technical 
assistance and other social intervention for beneficiaries. To this aim the NGOs make use, in 
part or entirely, of fund donated by supranational institutions and agencies, as well as from 
donor states. Some of the most developed NGOs offer different types of financial services, 
raise private funds and collect savings from their clients.  
Formal institutions can be further classified into three main categories: microfinance banks 
(MFBs), microfinance oriented banks (MFOBs) and microfinance sensitive banks (MFSBs). 
They can all offer credit and they are all deposit-taking institutions: for these reasons, they are 
all under banking regulation. Within MFBs, it is possible to list a limited number of pure 
microfinance banks (PMFBs), cooperative banks and development banks.  
PMFBs are banks specialized in offering only microfinance services. These may be the 
result of upscaling of NGOs specialized in microcredit that have converted to banks in order 
to maximize the economic sustainability of their initiatives and widen their client base. 
Alternatively, such intermediaries may result from a process of privatization of public banks, 
with the aim of providing financial support to the local community. Lastly, they may be 
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newly created banks which aim to enter into the microfinance market, attracted by the large 
profits and positive performances achieved by intermediaries specialized in micro-enterprises. 
Microfinance services can also be offered by different types of cooperative institutions, 
which operate exclusively or mainly for the benefit of their own members. These include 
more organized credit unions – such as those based in the UK and Ireland- which offer credit 
and other services to their own members; the Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs), more common in developing countries, which provide rotating credit to their own 
members using resources from a centralized fund made available by the savings of the 
members themselves; and cooperative credit banks. Despite their differences, the common 
characteristics of these institutions lie in the legal status of cooperative companies and in the 
possibility to collect time deposits, mainly through partners. The chance to offer demand 
deposits, on the other hand, is largely prohibited by regulatory authorities, due to the higher 
complexity that would derive for those institutions in liquidity management, as well as for the 
higher contribution to the systematic risk. Development banks are large, centralized, and 
usually government-owned banks created to support specific sectors (small business 
developing banks) or geographic areas (rural development banks); in some developing 
countries they  also take the form of private banks. Finally, in recent years, within formal 
microfinance institutions, it has been possible to include some commercial banks, banking 
groups and financial conglomerates. Here, two categories of intermediaries can be identified: 
microfinance-oriented banks and microfinance-sensitive banks. 
In the area of microfinance-oriented banks it is possible to group together all the banks or 
financial institutions which are specialized in financing small to medium enterprises and 
micro-enterprises and which are therefore professionally inclined to take an active part in 
microfinance programmes. These are mainly small, local banks, strongly rooted in the local 
territory, as well as financial institutions which come directly from local bodies. Finally, in 
the sphere of microfinance-sensitive banks it is possible to include all the banks and financial 
intermediaries that, for economic reasons or for the positive externalities deriving for their 
own image, view microfinance as an attractive opportunity. These consist, mainly, of banking 
groups, particularly large ones, or financial conglomerates which decide to enter into the 
microfinance sector – downscaling their traditional activities – albeit to a limited extent 
compared to their own core business, creating specific companies or specialized divisions 
within their organizations (Molyneux, P., Vallelado, E., 2008). 
 
 5 
    The nature of microfinance: microfinance vs. microcredit 
 
Micro-credit is defined as a credit (small amounts) provided to very poor, often 
unemployed people without any collateral, to help them live better1. Just small credits can 
help these people to repay their previous loans and start their own new business. The amount 
of credit is smaller and the credit cycle is shorter than standard loans of commercial 
institutions – typically from six to twelve months with weekly or fortnightly installments. The 
system of installments; built on regular, fixed small installments starting very early after 
contract is signed; is less encumbering for clients but is more exacting from administrative 
aspect. 
The interest rate of microcredits seems to be very high in comparison with standard bank 
loans in developed part of the world. The interest earnings should cover the probability of 
default, inflation and mainly the administrative costs; they can be 10 – 25 % of the sum of 
credits advanced by MFI2. The most of MFIs are financed externally by international 
organizations, NGOs or the state budgets – the measure of dependence on this revenue and 
self-sustainability should be the talking point in following sections.  
What is microfinance? Microfinance refers to small-scale financial services –primarily  
credit and savings – provided to people who farm or fish or herd; who operate small 
enterprises or microenterprises where goods are produced, recycled, repaired, or sold; who 
provide services; who work for wages or commissions; who gain income from renting out 
small amounts of land, vehicles, draft animals, or machinery and tools; and to other 
individuals and groups at the local levels of developing countries, both rural and urban. 
(Robinson, 2001). 
Thus, the broader definition of microfinance includes not only microcredits but also other 
financial services, which can be offered to the poor.  Interested economists found soon that 
not only small credits but also other services connected with lending could improve economic 
lives of the poorest (Bauer, Chytilova, Morduch, 2008). In these days we can include also 
improvement in health care and infrastructure to the system of microfinance. The most of 
MFIs connect their credit services also with educational or saving programs or business 
trainings, retraining scheme or technical trainings. Logically the investments can be more 
profitable when the people have access to training, which can improve their skills. The costs 
                                                 
1
 The poor means at least 900 million households around the world. 
2
 According to Muhammad Yunus, the interest rate of MFIs should be determined max. 10 % above market 
interest rate. 
 6 
of these programs obviously increase the interest rates but the gains for both the borrowers 
and MFIs outweigh them. For example in organizations as Pro Mujer and Freedom from 
Hunger, the training is a central part of the provision of credit. The courses for dressmakers 
are very common. After successfully passing the course, women can ask for credit on the 
sewing machine.  The training needs to be focused not only on business or technical skills, but 
also for better knowledge of proper nourishment - mostly of children: the nutritious foods to 
feed children, the importance of breast feeding or how to treat a child with diarrhea (McNelly, 
Watetip, Lassen and Dunford, 1996). 
Various researches found that the poor do not have all the expenditures in small sums like 
for clothing and food. From time to time they need also bigger amounts necessitated by 
different situations. Some can be predictable like a dowry, the education of children, home 
building and festivals. Very poor people spend surprisingly lot for various festivals (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2006).  Another situation can be unpredictable like emergency cases such as a 
sudden sickness and injury or wars, floods or other natural disasters. Finally yet importantly, 
the poor can face an investment opportunity such as buying land or other productive assets or 
setting up a new business. For these cases people should have some savings, but poor people 
have difficulties to save in traditional institutions or at home, thus, they try to make use of 
other non-official ways like  deposit collectors, credit cooperatives or Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (ROSCA). Here is a place for another innovative component of 
microfinance – microsavings. 
 
Brief history of MFIs 
 
Over the past 10 years or so, microfinance has rapidly evolved and expanded from the 
relatively narrow field of micro enterprise credit to the more comprehensive concept of 
microfinance (which includes a range of financial services for poor people, including savings, 
money transfers and insurance) to the enormous challenge of building inclusive financial 
systems. Although the history of microfinance could be divided into several pivotal parts, the 
revolutionary progress was initiated in 1976 by Muhammad Yunus. This economic professor 
and successful founder of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh started out by loaning 28 USD 
for working capital to a group of petty traders and crafts people, mostly women, in the village 
close to Chittagong University. With a simple system of small and frequent payments and 
minimal paperwork, the women paid back their loans in full and on time. In addition, micro 
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credit program has found that women are more likely to repay their loans and in general are 
more reliable borrowers. But more importantly, given that microcredit´s purpose is primarily 
social, women tend to spend their own earnings on better nutrition, housing and education for 
their families. This brings long-term benefits to the community, cutting into the cycle of 
chronic poverty and dependency. A recent World Bank study shows that wage levels are 
higher in the villages served by Grameen and that the health, education and self-esteem of its 
borrowers and their families are significantly improved (Vukson, W. B. Z., 2003). 
Many organizations from NGOs to chartered banks have followed in Grameen´s steps, 
adapting its techniques to widely different environments. His successful advances lead to 
improvement of poverty in developing countries were awarded in 2006 when Mr. Muhammad 
Yunus  and his Grameen Bank obtained  the Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to create 
economic and social development from below“3. 
 
Products and services in modern microfinance 
 
For a long time the offer of financial services to low-income clients meant the granting of 
microloans to develop microbusinesses. The beneficiaries of microcredit have typically been 
´the poorest of the poor´, the ´poor´ and women, who have mainly benefited from small loans 
used to finance their cash flow. In the past decades microcredit projects have assumed wider 
features than their original ones. In modern microfinance the ´poorest of the poor´ is no longer 
the only client. All the victims of financial exclusion have now been added to the traditional 
target beneficiaries. In addition to developing countries, there are now industrialized countries 
with high levels of financial exclusion; in addition to the non-profit institutions there are an 
ever-increasing number of traditional credit intermediaries. 
The step from microcredit to microfinance requires the effort of reconsideration of the 
business models and the distribution methodology of financial services. It is not by chance 
that many authors define the current period as the ´financial services era´ and underline how 
the recent consideration of the variety of new financial services motivates the knowledge of 
an increasing complexity and variety of needs of low income clients (Rutherford, 2003). 
The poor, in fact, do not only need productive loans: they need further financial services in 
order to meet other specific needs. Examples are the demand for credit or savings in order to 
                                                 
3
 The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html 
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provide education for their children; the need for insurance services to deal with shock or 
emergency situations; the requirement for savings and insurance services to meet the costs of 
old age and funeral services. From this perspective, it is then possible to distinguish between 
the following needs: a) medium and long term funding needs (circulating and fixed capital), 
b) access to safe, fast and cheap payment systems, c) saving and liquidity needs or d) risk 
hedging.  
Such needs can be met by using the typologies of financial services that are typically 
considered in the studies of financial intermediation: credit products – the most common 
credit products in microfinance are microcredit and microleasing. The first is offered mainly 
for circulating capital needs and rarely for needs in the medium to long term; the second is for 
lasting needs. Some of recent experiences of micro-venture-capital can also be added to credit 
products.  
The second most widely used group are  savings products – saving mobilization is an 
important tool in microfinance, both for MFIs and the clients. For MFIs the collection of the 
savings represents a fundamental instrument in achieving sustainability. Indeed, saving 
mobilization allows clients to obtain the resources to finance the growth of the loan portfolio 
and consequently, to become independent from subsidies or external financing. For the poor 
and more generally, for financially excluded people, access to deposit services allows them to 
manage emergencies and to meet expected expenses, such as education, marriage ceremonies, 
old age and death. Microbusiness income are often uncertain and irregular, something that 
implies difficulties in acceding to types of credit that require fixed regular repayments. In 
these cases, savings represent a fundamental instrument in the management of temporary 
imbalances in the microbusinesses. Furthermore, the majority of the poor receive flows of 
remittances from their families living in urban areas or abroad; access to deposit services is, 
therefore, necessary in order to keep these payments secure. In microfinance the demand for 
saving deposits acts with the same motivation that characterizes the formal system: savings 
are, in fact, the money saved today to be spent in the future for the needs of the family and for 
business.  
Another essential financial service presents so-called payment services – alongside 
savings and loan products, a limited number of MFIs have begun to offer payment services 
also. These are included in a category of financial services that the poor request in order to 
have the possibility of transferring money through secure channels. The demand for such 
services mainly derives from those categories of clients that have a greater managerial ability 
and those need to perform transactions through alternative means to cash – often associated 
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with deposit products – such as cheques, bank transfers and credit/debit cards. Recently some 
MFIs have begun to offer credit cards, debit cards and smart cards. Overall the demand for 
payment services arises – considering the necessary exceptions – through the specific needs 
of banking clients: safety, availability and accessibility to payment instruments, fast and 
cheap settlement. On the other hand, the MFIs that offer payment services are not, so far, 
numerous because of the complexity of the infrastructure and the technology that payment 
systems require.  
Last group are insurance products – the demand for health and loan insurance derives 
from the need of low-income customers to limit and cover the risks in case of death or loss of 
assets. Microinsurance products, drawn up to reduce uncertainty and its effects, represent a 
fundamental instrument in microfinance, given the vulnerability of the poor to risk. Natural 
disasters, health problems of the beneficiary or death of livestock, are all events that can be 
dealt with by microfinance, do find in insurance cover an important management solution. It 
is necessary to point out, that microinsurance is not always the best solution for reducing the 
vulnerability of the poor to risks and for improving the quality of the loan portfolio. Insurance 
is a high risk business; in developed countries this is limited to insurance companies or to 
financial intermediaries used to managing a single portfolio of numerous, similar, risks. In 
developing countries, many MFIs operate at the limits of legality, this being due to an 
unfavorable legal and regulatory context and/or the inability of many MFIs to define and 
successfully manage microinsurance schemes. These aspects show how it is very often 
advisable to create partnerships with formal insurance providers, rather than offering 
microinsurance products directly. These partnerships present various advantages for formal 
insurers as well as for MFIs. The insurers can gain access to new markets, MFIs can benefit 
from the expertise of formal institutions in defining client responsive products, without 
having to spend time and resources in the design phase of the product. On the other hand, 
offering insurance products directly involves incurring greater risks, especially if the 
insurance side of the business is not separate from the savings and credit side. Furthermore, 
directly offering insurance products requires different skills from those required for credit or 
saving supply. Finally, the MFIs can incur more moral hazard problems (Torre La, M., -
Vento, G. A., 2006). 
 
    Problems affecting MFIs 
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Although there have been various successful stories about microfinance institutions 
helping the poor, they face many problems. The problems can be solved on many occasions 
but sometimes cannot be avoided. We discuss the problems MFIs face under the following 
broad categories.  
1. Ethical Reasons: Microfinance Institutions can be often viewed as a profit making 
organization. The desire to make MFIs an industry, commercialize micro-lending or enable 
them to be a profit making institutions should not distract them from one important aspect for 
which they are formed in the first place: social service by enabling poor to work on profit 
making projects or small businesses. Many a times, the lack of this aspect can lead the 
microfinance institutions to behave similar to the local moneylenders. Furthermore, the 
important point of corruption cannot be neglected. Another reason of failure has been lack of 
motivation. MFIs thrive on better economical conditions and an economic down turn can 
incur heavy loss on them. In such adverse situations, MFIs generally lose man power too4. 
 2. Managerial Reasons: One of the major problems which the MFIs can resolve is 
managerial problems. They tend to be fairly straightforward and the solutions to them are also 
pretty straightforward. Managerial problems are a major factor and they have more effects 
than any other problems discussed. These problems include mainly:  lack of management 
training, poor record keeping and obviously lack of management capacity.  
3. Legal Reasons: Microfinance institutions can be viewed as a social organization helping 
the poor and a profit organization too. In many countries, profit organizations are registered 
under different set of acts and non-profit organizations come under different legislations. On 
the first view, it could seem unsubstantial, but these legalities sometimes create 
complications5.  
4. “Unfortunate” Reasons: Sometimes microfinance institutions have to face problems 
which cannot be resolved. These problems arise in cases when something “unfortunate” 
happens to a person or a community (e.g. a flood or famine can kill the hopes of farmers to 
pay their loans).  
                                                 
4
 In Tanzania, during economic down turn the MFIs perform poorly because of lack of motivation, resulting in 
below par loan repayment. 
5
 For example, TBF had to face some problems like how to lend loans as a charitable organization in India. In 
India, TBF cannot register as a bank given the enormous barriers for becoming one. Instead, TBF resorted to 
register itself as a charitable foundation and trust, which enabled it to receive funds internationally and 
domestically for development purposes. But as a charitable foundation, TBF was not allowed to indulge in to 
money lending and hence all loans distributed by them were entered as “aid”. The repayments were entered as 
“donations” with 8% service fee. This in an idealized situation is good but TBF still has to face chronic 
defaulters who don’t repay loans. The usual tactics in this case entail a combination of personal persuasion and 
religious obligations. 
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5. Other Reasons: There are various other factors for the failure of MFI. Firstly: a) lack of 
vision is a factor which pushes new MFIs in to extinctions. Formation of an MFI requires 
considerable research and should have a clear cut vision of why they are operating and the 
clients they will be serving. Sadly, due to lack of research MFIs set up by NGOs fail to scale 
up. b) MFIs need trained staff to operate. In several cases, drop out of trained staff is very 
high which reduces the reach of an MFI. Furthermore, the “dropping out” rate is more than 
the “coming in” rate. c) MFIs serve society but they are also a profit-making institution. In 
many cases, MFIs achieve a lot of success in their programs in initial period, but they fail to 
maintain the same record in the long run because of lack of proper commercial orientation, 
thus making them unsustainable. 
 
    The historical financial crises and their impact on MFIs 
 
Before the discussion of the microfinance aspects of the current global financial crisis, we 
will provide a few comments on the previous recent crises. We will obviously concentrate on 
the lesson which the microfinance could draw from those crises. 
We will start with the  Asian financial crisis in the second half of 1990’s.  The causes of 
this crisis are mix of different reasons but common factors included overvalued exchange 
rates, structural weaknesses in the financial sector and excessive short-term borrowing (role 
of IMF) – leading to asset price inflation, speculation and increases in non-performing loans. 
These events led to recession in number of East Asian countries, slower growth, sharp 
increase of unemployment, increased inflation and higher interest rates. The most badly 
affected countries were Thailand and Indonesia, on the contrary, the Philippines survived 
initial shock well and little impact can be observed also in India and other South Asian 
countries. 
This economic and financial crisis could offer number of potential implications for 
microfinance. Economic recession resulted in fewer job opportunities in the formal sector, 
forcing more people into informal sector of economy. In combination with higher poverty, 
this increased number of potential microfinance clients – borrowers especially. At the same 
time, the profitability of microenterprises fell caused by increased competition among 
microentrepreneurs and reduced demand for their output. Resources for government 
development programs, often supporting MFIs, decreased. The weaknesses in financial 
institutions and overall financial system were made more visible in conditions of crisis. 
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These all effects of crisis had direct and indirect implications for microfinance. The 
preliminary results of survey of BWTP6 (April 1998) and survey of McGuire and Conroy 
(July-August 1998) were that the crisis affected more Indonesia than other countries, although 
other countries as the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand were influenced. The crisis had 
greater impact on institutions serving small business clients than on specialist MFIs serving 
the poor. And logical conclusion is that MFIs more linked into the formal financial system 
suffered more. 
As another significant financial crisis could be regarded the financial crisis in Latin 
America in years 1998 and 1999. The mainly discussed affected countries were Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, but also other countries suffered heavily without such publicity – 
including Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. There were other factors which contributed 
to deterioration of crisis in particular countries – civil war in Colombia, the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation phenomenon in Peru and Ecuador and the crackdown on coca production in 
Bolivia. The economic slowdown heavily influenced the financial statements of commercial 
banks – growth of loan portfolio stagnated, profitability fell and problems with loan 
repayments began to rise. The banking regulators were trying to prevent growing number of 
banks’ falls. The MFIs were not immune to the economic situation in Asia as well as in Latin 
America, but after years, we could say that well-established MFIs performed as well or even 
better than their counterparts in the commercial part of banking sector did. Some MFIs 
showed that their business strategy could also be a powerful tool for surviving and growing in 
hard times. 
For example, in terms of growth the leading MFIs of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru have 
outperformed countries’ commercial banks every year since 1997. After hard times in 1998 
and 1999, the portfolio growth of MFIs reached substantially high level in 2000 – 47.9 
percent in Peru and 26.8 percent in Colombia. At the same time, although growth of 
commercial banks’ portfolios also improved slightly, still they reported almost no growth 
rates. In case of Bolivian MFIs, they still outperformed country’s commercial banks every 
year from 1997 but the pace had slowed. The worst time of Bolivian MFIs was in 1999, when 
Borrowers’ revolt took off. The commercial banks of Bolivia and Peru managed to keep their 
returns on breakeven level, but Colombian banks experienced substantial fall of profits.  
                                                 
6
 The Banking with the Poor (BWTP) Network initiated survey of the impact of the crisis on microfinance. 
Survey covered nine Southeast Asian (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and South Asian 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) countries (MicroBanking Bulletin No. 2, July 1998). 
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On the other hand, MFIs managed to maintain not only high growth rate of portfolio but 
also its quality during the crisis. For example in Colombia through the period 1997 - 2000, the 
loan delinquency rates of MFIs were kept near to level of 3 percent but rose to double digits 
for commercial banks. The MFIs used many strategies to prevent bad impacts of crisis but the 
three general types can be identified – survival (case of FIE), consolidation and growth. These 
tactics had evidently common goal to maintain healthy portfolio, liquidity, solvency and low 
recovery and operating costs. The MFIs with sufficient capacity and preparation could begin 
to serve new segment of clients or to offer new services. But all these strategies have 
depended on preserved loyalty of clients and adaptability of both clients as well as MFIs. The 
ability of adaptation of low-income individuals and enterprises was key advantage for MFIs 
in comparison to large commercial institutions serving wealthier clients. The MFIs, as 
Argentinean FIE, were inspired by adaptability of their clients and began to adjust their 
business activities to survive the period of crisis – extension of open hours, working also on 
Sundays, visits clients in their shops and homes, extension of repayment period or 
rescheduling of delinquent loans. 
Next important factor which helped MFIs to survive was international assistance during 
crisis. The study of Westley and Shaffer (1999) which stated that microenterprises in Brazil, 
Mexico, Belize and the Dominican Republic generated 20 percent of their GDP influenced 
big financial institutions as the IDB to support microfinance sector. In period from 1990 to 
1999, the IDB financed Latin American microfinance projects by amount of more than US$ 
690 million. Such international financial injections were important for example for Banco 
Solidario, Ecuador. Because of its well-organized business plan, they received US$ 30 
million from group of international investors when Ecuadorian government was not able to 
obtain financial aid. 
 
    The Current Financial Crisis & MFIs  
 
The present global credit crisis caused by subprime mortgages seems not to be an ideal 
situation for providing unsecured loans to very poor people without relevant credit history. 
But in comparison with other financial institutions, the MFIs have survived past financial 
crises relatively not affected. As we have seen, during the Asian crisis and crisis in Latin 
America the institutions serving poor people generally performed better than commercial 
banks.  
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The size of impact depends on several factors, such as structure of institution’s 
liabilities, institution’s financial state and economic health of clients. So far, there is little 
evidence how microclients have been affected by the crisis. Moreover, it is not easy to 
identify which effects are directly related to the crisis and which are connected to preexisting 
situations or conditions.  
The most of MFIs successfully survived past financial crises, but history does not have to 
be guide for predicting of outcomes of all future crises. Microfinance is much more connected 
to financial market during the current global financial crisis than it was the case with previous 
crises; much more MFIs are already transformed into regulated deposit-taking banks with 
access to commercial funding sources. By the early 2000s, MFIs have appeared on 
international capital market – first microfinance IPO of Bank Rakyat Indonesia and the 
emergence of microfinance collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) as well as IPO of Mexican 
Banco Compartamos. The IPO involved secondary offering of 30% of bank’s stock and raised 
substantially US$ 40 million, yielding to investors the international rate of return of over 
100% compounded over 8 years. The bank’s issue was 13 times oversubscribed (Watson, 
2009). 
By 2007, the worldwide MFIs had received (estimated) US$ 5 billion of foreign 
investment from developed countries. As result, present microfinance system is connected to 
global markets by unprecedented degree. And these markets withstand to high degree of 
turmoil combining the worst effects of crises in 1990s. The global trade of year 2009 is 
projected to contract for the first time from 1982. Both GDP growth of developing countries 
and private capital flows to developing countries are projected to fall to roughly half their 
2007 levels. There emerge reductions in foreign investment and remittance flows, increases in 
country risk premiums and local credit spreads (Watson, 2009). 
The full effect of the global crisis and its triple shocks – economic contraction, currency 
depreciation and scarcity of credit, will fully show its power in emerging countries in the 
second half of year 2009. MFIs’ PAR +30 ratios already increased in the first quarter of 2009, 
but still remains below 5 percent for the most leading MFIs (CGAP). This year will be a key 
year to test the resilience of microfinance to macroeconomic turmoil. 
Recent data so far show that global financial crisis will stress MFIs and their clients, but 
the sector is quite robust and may emerge even stronger than before. The crisis has pointed 
out MFIs to the important role of local sources of funding. When international funding taps 
dries up, local deposits become even more critical to fuel MFIs’ lending. 
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Generally, the growth of the microfinance sector is (and will be) halted and is predicted 
not to reach more than 20 percent per year in case of Mexico. This number is visibly lower 
than in the past, when the growth attained records of 40-50 percent per year. Another effect 
will be the consolidation of MFIs and thus the number of microfinancing entities will slightly 
decline. However, the sector will be less affected than other major economic sectors as the 
crisis will affect its growth and quality of assets, but will not cause any major disruption, due 
to relative isolation of the microfinance markets from the beat of the global economics. The 
crisis will thus help the strongest ones and hurt the young and weak ones. 
Furthermore it is necessary to keep in mind that borrowers in foreign currency are 
exposed to the risk in the form of exchange rate fluctuations. Local banks funding MFIs are 
limited by global conditions. The MFIs could find difficult to refinance already existing debts. 
According to IFC, most MFIs have loans with one or two years’ maturity and there is 
potential refinancing gap of US$ 1.8 billion over the next 12-15 months. These problems with 
financing could encourage some MFIs to become legally regulated institutions able to collect 
deposits instead of constant chasing for funds. From this point of view, we can say that MFIs 
mostly affected by global liquidity contraction could be non-deposit taking MFIs funded 
primarily by foreign debt. The money from domestic and international banks and funds are 
limited, slower and more expensive7. The increasing interest rates, FX losses and more 
expensive funds lead to increase in operating costs, which are not always transferable on their 
clients. Thus, deposit-taking MFIs should survive the crisis better. Many of them are well 
isolated from refinancing risk and have a little (if any) need of external funding. 
Many deposit-taking MFIs collect not only deposits from poor but also from nonpoor 
customers. Here should be problem, because non-poor depositors could be more sensitive to 
the economic downturn. The loss of confidence and run on deposits in USA and Europe can 
also lead to same reaction in developing countries. The high withdrawals are and will be 
caused by high prices of food and energies and lower remittances. Another reason could be 
that at least some microloans finance consumption, not investment, and thus debtors will need 
to withdraw their savings or use new loan for paying them off. This could work as long as 
new credit will be available. For example many Mexican MFIs repay in advance their USD 
liabilities, in order to prevent FX related problems and in many cases register reduction of the 
demand for microcredit. According to data of Prodesarollo, 60 percent of Mexican MFIs are 
threatened due to reduction of funding. 
                                                 
7
 According to CGAP, the rates in Latin America and South and Central Asia grew from 1 % to 4 %. 
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Many microbusinesses serve local needs by basic products, which could be unaffected or 
even supported by crisis. In time of crisis, people prefer cheaper or less quality products, 
which microbusinesses usually offer. Microenterprises, as in previous crises, are very 
adaptable. Microentrepreneurs could adjust to deteriorated conditions by involving of more 
family members in business or by adjusting the portfolio of products and/or their prices. 
Businesses serving subsistence goods as food and clothes could even earn on crisis because 
the demand for these goods remain steady in any times. MFIs highly serving SMEs, which 
have tendency to be more influenced by economic slowdown, or focused on consumer 
lending will suffer the most. Also, the decreasing remittances from abroad will have bad 
effect on microclients, which used microloans as consumption loans, and remittances are used 
for repayments.   
The financial problems of MFIs could provoke the loss of confidence that MFIs could be 
able to provide other loans. In this situation, the debtors could lose incentives to repay their 
already existing debts. The microfinance system is established, among others, on principles of 
mutual responsibility and confidence in future funding in case of no repayment problems. 
Therefore, why should microcreditors repay their loans when no else will be available? This 
could deteriorate the MFIs’ loans portfolio quality and MFIs should more focus on 
monitoring their clients and efforts on clients’ confidence.  
Naturally, smaller and younger MFIs are more affected than older and bigger players are. 
According to CGAP survey, 64 percent of small MFIs have reported funding problems in past 
six months in comparison to only 35 percent of large MFIs. Small and medium MFIs seem to 
be more fighting with liquidity issues – 74 percent of managers of MFIs from the survey have 
expected that their liquidity situation will worsen in the next six months. Regionally, the most 
pressing needs for capital appear in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia – 68 percent and 57 
percent of MFIs, respectively, reporting the liquidity problems8. 
The impact of the crisis on microfinance sector will also differ by geographical location 
of MFIs. The location of MFIs is important factor because of economic, regulatory and 
country-specific conditions influencing development of MFIs. The governments’ measures 
could help but also hurt MFIs. The risks of government interventions include interest-rate 
ceilings, mass loan forgiveness, encouragement of delinquent borrower associations and 
development of credit programs in government agencies that lack financial expertise and so 
on. Some of these tactics could be already observed in several countries of Latin America 
                                                 
8
 According to surveyed MFIs´assets, they were distributed in three groups: Tier 1 – assets above US$ 50 
million, Tier 2 – assets in range of US$3 million – US$ 50 million and Tier 3 – assets below US$ 3     million. 
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(Gonzalez-Vega/OSU cited in CGAP, 2008). On other hand, the government interventions 
could encourage the transformation of MFIs in regulated subjects able to mobilize deposits or 
adaptation of cautious, better, lending policies.  
According to separation by regions, we can analyze impact of crisis on MFIs in particular 
segments – East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and 
North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
March 2009, CGAP surveyed over 400 MFIs from all regions to identify present impacts of 
crisis9.  
 
East Asia and the Pacific - EAP 
 
The region was hit relatively hard by the food crisis, although many economies in region 
are specialized on agriculture. In 2005-2007, the food prices increased by 12.4% in rural areas 
and 13.8% in urban areas, the number of poor people increased by 4.9% in rural areas and 6.3  
in urban ones (World Bank GEPs, 2009). The microclients are thus spending higher share of 
their income on food and basic goods. Savings are decreasing because they are replaced by 
basic consumption. Female microlenders are probably hit harder than in other regions, they 
should work more and harder, eat less to be able to feed their families. Logically, people 
working in export-oriented businesses, construction and tourism are significantly affected. 
The growth of economies is slowing down – 8% in 2008 and 5.3% in 2009, but will be 
probably higher than in the rest of the world, mainly driven by China (World Bank, April 
2009). According to list of fastest growing microfinance markets publicized in MBB no. 17, 
autumn 2008, the Philippines, China, Indonesia and Cambodia are among top 20 for 2006-
200710. 
According to CGAP, 77% of DFI loans to MFIs are denominated in hard currency. The 
investment flows still does not stop – four international investors provided capital injection of 
US$ 5 million to Bank Sri Partha, Indonesia in April 2009. Korea postponed the 
implementation of the Basel II from January 2009 to 2010 because of remaining capital 
requirement low and thus ease liquidity. Moreover, the Korean government promised to 
                                                 
9
 CGAP asked over 400 MFI managers in different regions. LAC – 114 MFIs, MENA – 29 MFIs, SSA – 115 
MFIs, SA – 59 MFIs, EAP – 26 MFIs, ECA – 44 MFIs. Around 76 percent of respondents were institutions 
of Tier 2 or 3, assets below US$ 50 million. Credit unions and cooperatives represented 14.5 percent of 
sample. The survey was publicized in May 2009. 
10
 The MBB publicized list of countries which have aggregate growth in borrowers above the 20 percent  global 
median. 
 
 18 
provide almost US$ 73 million in direct loans and guarantees to micro and small businesses in 
financing troubles (Watson, 2009). 
Although, most MFIs – 69% - has reported deterioration of loan portfolio quality, in EAP 
region is the ratio lower - 58% - with expectation of decrease in next 6-12 months. The 
portfolio has declined or stagnated in two thirds of cases, but predictions for next months are 
positive. Half of respondents recorded limitations because of liquidity contraction. 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia - ECA 
 
The ECA region seems to be most affected by the crisis. The crisis caught many countries 
of region in very vulnerable position caused by relatively high current account deficits, 
elevated external debt levels, very rapid credit growth and consumption boom financed by 
foreign borrowing. In addition, the highly leveraged microfinance market is really exposed to 
troubles of less liquidity and refinancing risk. According to CGAP, 84 percent of DFI loans to 
MFIs are denominated in hard currency. Fortunately, multilateral funders – EBRD, EIB and 
WB – promised to provide up to US$ 24.5 billion as support for banking sector for funding 
businesses in the region. Good news is that Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kosovo and Armenia belong among 20 fastest growing microfinance markets worldwide. On 
the other side, the real incomes steeply declined due to currencies depreciation in second half 
of 2008 – 30 % for Hungary, 40% for Poland, 25% for Turkey and 70% for Ukraine. Number 
of poor and vulnerable people is expected to rise by about 5 million people for every 1 
percent decline in GDP (CGAP, 2009).  
According to CGAP survey, the microclients of this region appear to be most affected 
where the urban clients seem to be more affected than rural ones. The unemployment is 
increasing, remittances decreasing, profits of microentrepreneurs going down – all these 
factors lead to repayment difficulties higher than in other regions. 87 percent of surveyed 
MFIs answered that their PAR +30 has increased in last six month. And more than half of 
respondents reported that their gross loan portfolio went down in last six months. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean – LAC 
 
According to IMF, eight of twenty developing countries whose economies have reacted 
most sharply to economic deterioration – measured by exchange rate depreciation, increase in 
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spreads and equity market declines – are situated in LAC region. Some countries of this 
region are among the countries with highest developed microfinance markets and have been 
the cradle of commercial microfinance. The exposure to currency volatility is high – 73% of 
DFI loans to MFIs are denominated in hard currency. These could be two of reasons why the 
crisis has hit hard this region. On contrary, Mexico and Bolivia successfully have resisted the 
deteriorated economic conditions. Moreover, Mexico and Haiti are among 20 fastest growing 
microfinance markets worldwide. In first quarter of 2009, Mexican Banco Compartamos 
reported net profit of US$ 21.9 million and 44,000 of new clients in its portfolio. 
Microclients in this region are hardest affected by crisis, by high and volatile food prices, 
after ECA region. The repayment capacity is lower, the business activity and volume of 
remittances from abroad are decreasing – according to WB’s outlook the annual percent 
change will be in range of (-4.4,-7.7) in 2009, increasing again in 2010. Two thirds of 
respondents answered that clients in urban areas are most affected. Together with women, 
they are facing to more repayment difficulties – three quarters of respondents indicated that 
their clients have problems with repayment. 71 percent of respondents reported increase in 
PAR +30 in last six months. 
 
Middle East and North Africa - MENA 
 
So far, MENA region has been less exposed to the impact of global crisis. Many 
economies in region are growing, rate of unemployment is stable in the most of countries and 
local banks are still not facing liquidity troubles. MFIs are also less affected, partly because of 
the fact that investment in microfinance sector is largely driven by DFIs and there is only low 
exposure to currency volatility – 16% of DFI loans to MFIs are denominated in hard currency. 
The growth of region is expected to decline from 6% in 2008 to 2.5% in 2009. 
The microclients are significantly less affected by crisis than in the rest of the world. 
Lower segment of clients have not experienced any drastic economic slowdown yet, only less 
willingness to expansion and credits from bigger borrowers (CGAP, 2009). In period of 2005-
2007, food prices increased by 25.9 percent in rural areas, and by 12.5 percent in urban areas. 
Securing food expenditures remains priority but it is less problematic than in other regions, 
namely in comparison to the rest of African continent. Only Morocco seems to be seriously 
affected, but not only from reasons directly related to the crisis. 
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Microfinance sector seems to be quite healthy, due to the fact that many MFIs in region 
operate in highly regulated financial markets. MFIs in region have highest equity to asset 
ratios of all regions and Morocco and Egypt depend among 20 fastest growing microfinance 
markets worldwide. 67 percent of respondents reported that they had not to face any liquidity 
constraints in past six months. Gross loan portfolio has increased in 46% surveyed MFIs and 
62% MFIs reported increasing of PAR +30. 
 
South Asia – SA 
 
In 2008, GDP growth rate in SA region decreased substantially to 6.3 percent from 8.4 
percent in 2007. Even before the crisis, the region was affected by rising inflationary 
pressures and tight credit conditions. The banking sector has been rather isolated from effects 
of crisis as its exposure to toxic assets has been very limited, the exposure to currency 
volatility is low - only 18% of DFI loans to MFIs are denominated in hard currency. 
 
Disturbing fact is that large proportion of the region’s population is poor and thus highly 
vulnerable to changes in credit availability. The higher prices of food force microclients to 
spend more of their income on substantial food, their savings capacity is decreasing. 
According to CGAP, 10 percent increase in food prices would lead to estimated increase of 
4.4 percent in poverty headcount in urban areas and 1.7 percent in rural areas. 
Concerning microfinance, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan are among the 20 fastest 
growing microfinance markets worldwide. Moreover, Indian initiatives to increase liquidity 
and lower foreign exchange risk have made difficult to crisis affected the microfinance sector. 
According to Watson, the Central Bank increased foreign lending restrictions for non-bank 
financial companies where many of them are MFIs, let the rupee depreciate to slow the 
outflow of capital and has been providing extra funding for financial sector. The overall 
impact of crisis on region has been limited until now, also because of proactive measurements 
of governments like these in India. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa – SSA 
 
Although SSA region is the developing region least integrated into global economy, 
growth is supposed to fall from 5.5 percent in 2008 to 1.7 percent in 2009. Many of the poor 
were already hit by recent increases in food prices and sharp declines in remittances’ to the 
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region from abroad. Even though some countries as Senegal have experienced rise in 
remittances. 
Due to high food price volatility – i.e. food staple price inflation is 40 percent in Kenya 
and 27 percent in Zambia; the share of income spent on food is also increasing. According to 
Global Economic Prospects 2009, the 10 percent increase in food prices would lead to 
estimated increase of 2.8 percent in poverty headcount in urban areas. Because of strong 
saving base, the microfinance sector in SSA is less dependent on international capital and 
donors’ money. The levels of deposits are high especially in countries of Western Africa. 
There is only moderate exposure to currency volatility – only 31 percent of DFI loans to MFIs 
are denominated in hard currency. Moreover, only small part of MFI debt is priced at 
commercial rates. The shortage of demand for microentrepreneurs’ products and higher prices 
of basic inputs have severe effect on microclients. The clients are facing to decreasing savings 
because of more money spent on food and thus increasing difficulties with repayments. 
Only Togo and Kenya are among the 20 fastest growing microfinance markets worldwide. 
According to Watson, key problem of MFIs in Kenya is repayment rate. One of MFIs, Jamii 
Bora, has seen increase in non-performing loans due to lower sales of clients’ businesses. In 
May 2008, the Kenyan government implemented Kenyan Microfinance Act which enables to 
regulated MFIs accept clients’ deposits. It could be expected that these deposit taking MFIs 
survive better the crisis. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our discussion shows that MFIs are very useful instrument for elimination of  problems of 
poverty and stimulation of own small businesses in developing countries. Microfinance is a 
dynamic field of business and there is clearly no best way to deliver products and services to 
the low-income people. From this point of view, the microfinance clients (or participants) are 
not only provided microcredits, microsavings but they may receive also microinsturances or 
micropayments, which are not so much utilized otherwise due to relatively enormous high 
costs. Nevertheless, MFIs are immediately forced these services innovate according to client’s 
wishes. 
On the other hand, we could identify a lot of barriers, which obstruct easier and faster 
development of these institutions for example: ethnical problems, managerial resources, legal 
recourses, unfortunate recourses and other.  The size of that negative impact for MFIs 
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depends on several important factors like geographical, economical, political and social 
conditions. 
While the performance of microfinance institutions in general is quite well documented 
and researched, there are still open questions about microfinance ability to survive during 
financial crises. The experience of MFI with past crisis was in general positive. On one hand, 
MFI were able to survive major macroeconomic disturbances because of its close to links 
with micro-foundations of the economy. On the other hand, the microfinance institutions in 
the times of crises benefited from the international help which concentrated on the basic 
survival of the less wealthy part of the population. Therefore this international help was either 
channeled through microfinance institutions or it help them function due to secondary 
transmission.  
The current global financial crisis is different because of its global nature – the global 
transfers and humanitarian help is not longer available in such scale as in the regional crises. 
This restricts the sources for microfinance. From the regional point of view, the impact of the 
global crisis on microfinance is the most adverse in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
region, while it is relatively mild in other regions, where the microfinance was traditionally 
utilized. 
 However, the main test of resilience of microfinance system to current global economic 
events will come during the years at the end of global financial crisis and after this crisis. The 
MFIs are much more connected to international financial market than before. The impact of 
the crisis has already appeared in tightening of capital sources and lower demand for product 
of microentrepreneurs. Nevertheless, microfinance sector is known for its adaptability in past 
crises and it performed relatively well in the current global financial crisis too. 
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